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COFFEE, MEXICO’S OTHER BEAN: AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
THE COFFEE INDUSTRY, ITS IMPACT ON 
MEXICAN VILLAGES, AND THE POSSIBILITY 
OF SURVIVING THE GRIND 
I. INTRODUCTION1 
From an early morning boost to international conglomerates2 featuring 
$3.25 lattes on nearly every city corner, symbols of the coffee industry 
surround people worldwide in their everyday lives. The origin of coffee 
beans, the soul of the beverage, however, is not easily ascertained from its 
pretty packaging, whether in a smell-the-aroma can, a vacuum-sealed 
pouch, or a sturdy, heat sensitive, spill-resistant cup. Yet while the price of 
gourmet blends and specialized beverages increases,3 the price of beans 
around the world has decreased steadily for many years and has reached an 
all-time low.4 
 1. The purpose of this Note is to explore the effect that globalization has on the coffee industry 
in Mexico and the impact of certain international agreements on the industry. This Note will also 
explore current developments in fair trade and Mexican internal policies that affect the industry. This 
Note does not discuss the environmental or global implications of these agreements or trends, or the 
quality of coffee beans sold on the open market today. This Note does not assess the effect of 
international coffee companies on the industry. 
 2. Starbucks Coffee Company is the leading retailer, roaster, and brand of specialty coffee in 
the world, boasting over 2,000 retail locations and whole-bean coffee sales through specialty sales 
groups, direct-response business, supermarkets, and online sales. Business Editors, Starbucks and 
Conservation International Partner to Support Shade Coffee in Mexico (Feb. 24, 1999), 
http://www.businesswire.com/webbox/bw (on file with author). Starbucks is “the world’s fifth-largest 
buyer of coffee—behind . . . Nestle and Procter & Gamble.” Stanley Homes & Geri Smith, For Coffee 
Growers, Not Even a Whiff of Profits, BUS. WK., Sept. 9, 2002, at 110.  
 3. Specialty coffee sales, which accounted for over ten-percent of all coffee sales in 1989, 
tripled between 1983 and 1989, rising to a projected level of $675 million in retail sales in 1989 alone. 
Mark Robichaux, Boom in Fancy Coffee Pits Big Marketers, Little Firms, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1989, 
at B1. 
 4. While the retail price of a cup of coffee begins around $1.25 and the price of a pound of 
coffee may cost $12.00 or more, the price paid to the producers of coffee is relatively little, as low as 
$0.30 per pound. Most of the costs associated with coffee production (and reflected in the price paid 
by consumers) are incurred subsequent to primary production, in the processing, packaging, 
transporting, and retailing of the coffee. Janet Jarman, Coffee Crisis: The Hard Realities That Fill Your 
Cup, MSNBC News (2003), http://www.msnbc.com/modules/ps/020716coffee/launch.asp?b=hi (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2004). Production of coffee in Mexico ordinarily occurs on small farms in rural areas 
that rarely have the benefit of paved paths, modern machinery, or donkeys. Id. It is not unusual for 
coffee producers to first haul 150 pound sacks of coffee down steep mountainous terrain before 
transporting it by mule for miles over harsh terrain and on dirt paths, where they are preyed upon by 
bandits. Id. After discarding inferior beans, producers then remove the beans from their pulpy covering 
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Coffee is highly important in the global community as the second most 
internationally traded commodity.5 As the fifth largest coffee producer in 
the world, Mexico6 is reliant on the crop as a source of income for many of 
its citizens.7 The price of coffee, however, is notoriously unstable,8 and it 
has currently reached a 100-year low.9 In 2002, Mexico’s coffee producers 
faced a grave reality—they were forced to take a loss on each pound of 
coffee sold.10 In fact, while coffee straight from producers is priced at 
most at approximately fifty cents ($0.50) per pound, the cost of production 
is at least eighty cents ($0.80) per pound.11 The depressed price of coffee 
results both from an extreme excess of coffee beans in storage12 and an 
inelastic demand for coffee.13 
and then dry them in preparation for packaging. Id. The coffee is then traded with middlemen, known 
as “coyotes,” who are said to pay the farmers the bare minimum in order to exploit the producers’ lack 
of credit options and because they have no one else to whom they can sell. Id. The coyotes then sell 
the coffee to make their profit. Id. The coffee may change hands among the coyotes as many as fifteen 
times before ultimately reaching the consumer. Robert Collier, Mourning Coffee: World’s Leading 
Java Companies are Raking in High Profits But Growers Worldwide Face Ruin as Prices Sink to 
Historic Low, S.F. CHRON., May 20, 2001, at A1. A report released on Sept. 18, 2002 stated that 
farmers are paid roughly $0.24 per pound for their beans, which may represent the lowest price since 
1902. Tim Weiner, Low Prices Threaten Coffee Farmers’ Livelihood, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
19, 2002, at A7. 
 5. BART S. FISHER, THE INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AGREEMENT: A STUDY IN COFFEE 
DIPLOMACY 3 (1972). “From 1982 through 1984, the annual average value of trade in coffee was $9 
billion.” Alexander C. O’Neill, Emigrant Remittances: Policies to Increase Inflows and Maximize 
Benefits, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 345, 350 (2001). See also Grace H. Brown, Note, Making 
Coffee Good to the Last Drop: Laying the Foundation for Sustainability in the International Coffee 
Trade, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 247 (2004). 
 6. Note, however, that Vietnam, the world’s second-largest producer, sells more coffee than all 
of Cental America, including Mexico, combined. Coffee nonetheless remains a primary export for 
these Central American countries. Small, Vulnerable—and Disunited, ECONOMIST, Aug. 9, 2001, at 
http://www.economist.com/world/la/displayStory.cfm (last visited Jan. 30, 2004). 
 7. Claire Black, Mexico Farmers Abandon Coffee for Forests, REUTERS, May 24, 2002, 
http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/fairtrade/coffee/163.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2004). 
 8. “A one-cent decline in coffee prices means a foreign-exchange loss to Latin America of 
about forty-five million dollars a year.” RICHARD B. BILDER, THE INTERNATIONAL COFFEE 
AGREEMENT: A CASE HISTORY IN NEGOTIATION 333 (1963). For example, the coffee exports of 
Veracruz, one of Mexico’s main growing states, dropped from $307 million in the first five months of 
the 2000—2001 crop year, to $105 million in the first five months of the 2001/2002 crop year. Black, 
supra note 7.  
 9. See JARMAN, supra note 4 
 10. Homes & Smith, supra note 2. While some may asume that falling global coffee prices may 
give consumers the ability to purchase higher-quality beans at lower prices, the International Coffee 
Organization (ICO) has stated that “coffee makers are increasingly substituting low-quality beans in 
their ground coffee.” McLaughlin, supra note 6. This trend has led the ICO to issue new rules 
requiring coffee-exporting countries to improve their product by removing low-quality beans. The new 
ICO standards are higher than the current U.S. Food and Drug Administration rules, which permit 
sundry materials to constitute as much as thirty percent of each cup of “pure” coffee. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. According to the Oxfam report, approximately 660 million pounds of very low-quality coffee 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/6
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Mexico faces the challenge of balancing its national economic 
necessities with its interest in becoming a dominant player in the world 
market.14 As such, Mexico has adopted a neo-liberal philosophy.15 Yet the 
small, local producers face increased difficulties under the new regime, 
such as the inability to market their products in a global economy without 
using a middleman,16 poor transportation systems, and the impracticability 
of making a direct connection with coffee retailers.17 
This Note will discuss and analyze the various international agreements 
that have resulted in the globalization18 of the coffee industry, such as the 
Puebla-Panama Plan,19 and other movements, such as Fair Trade, which 
have been posed as solutions to the epidemic. Finally, this Note proposes 
that a combination of efforts, including the destruction of surplus and sub-
standard beans, a restructuring of international coffee agreements, and 
internal organization among coffee growers are necessary to resuscitate 
the Mexican coffee industry and to improve the life and future of people 
living in the south southeastern portion of Mexico. 
are currently sitting in warehouses belonging to forty major coffee companies. While destroying these 
surpluses would result in an estimated loss of $100 million, it is anticipated that it would “raise prices 
paid to coffee-producing nations by roughly $750 million.” See Weiner, supra note 4. 
 13. The elasticity of the coffee supply results from the afore-mentioned surplus of beans 
combined with the ever-increasing amount of beans produced each year. The inelasticity of demand 
for coffee is largely a result of taste: many people will pay a higher price for their early morning cup of 
coffee as opposed to selecting a cheaper alternative. At the same time, however, cheaper coffee does 
not seem to attract new coffee drinkers. Jill Draeger, Perking Up the Coffee Industry Through Fair 
Trade, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 337, 340 (2002). 
 14. Jeanine E. Dames, Note, An Examination of Mexico and the Unreasonable Goals of the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 10 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 
71 (1998).  
 15. Maria Eugenia Padua, Mexico’s Part in the Neoliberal Project, 8 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 1, 28 (2002).  
 16. Oxfam, a British charity, reported on Sept. 18, 2002 that, “[a]sking some of the poorest and 
most powerless people in the world to negotiate in an open market with some of the richest and most 
powerful results, unsurprisingly, in the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer.” Oxfarm 
International, Mugged: Poverty in your Coffee 7–9 (2002), available at 
http://www.oxfarmamerica.org/campaingcoffee/art3395.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2004). See also 
Peter Costantini, Coffee: Oaxaca’s Life Blood, at http://www.msnbc.com/news/168688.asp?cpl=l (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2004). 
 17. Laborers can be “paid per ‘lata,’ or bucket, of ripe cherries. One lata brought less than $2 [in 
2001], nearly half what it costs to grow the coffee. In a recent survey, the World Bank estimates that 
600,000 Central American laborers have lost their jobs due to the crisis.” See Jarman, supra note 4.  
 18. See Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights In a Globalized World, 19 B.C. INT’L. & 
COMP. L. REV. 273, 275–76 (2002). 
 19. The Plan Puebla-Panama (PPP) is a Mexican program created to revitalize not only the 
economy of the southeastern portion of Mexico, but also the Mexican economy as well as the 
economies of many Central American states. 
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II. HISTORY OF MEXICO AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AFFECTING 
THE COFFEE INDUSTRY 
A. The History of Coffee in Mexico 
1. Political and Economic History 
The political history of Mexico over the past few decades sheds light 
on the ongoing political and economic controversies, which significantly 
affect coffee producers and their families. Throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, partially due to the inflated market price of coffee,20 the Mexican 
government promoted coffee production to indigenous farmers,21 
particularly in the southern area of the country, where the climate is more 
conducive to coffee growth.22 Subsequently, President Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari, who took office in 1988, succeeded in shifting Mexico to a free-
market economy.23 Subsequently, President Ernesto Zedillo furthered the 
globalization and international trade philosophy inspired by Salinas.24 In 
 20. The Oxfam report provides a clear statement of the world-wide coffee crisis, stating:  
The coffee market is failing. It is failing producers on small family farms for whom coffee 
used to make money. It is failing local exporters and entrepreneurs who are going to the wall 
in the face of fierce international competition. And it is failing governments that had 
encouraged coffee production to increase export earnings. 
Weiner, supra note 4. 
 21. Dr. Ranee Khooshie Lal Panjabi described the phenomenon in the 1970s: 
The lack of diversity of many developing economies—part of the imperial heritage which 
geared these economies to the particular needs of the colonial power—meant that often these 
nations, short of foreign exchange, tended to overproduce their major agricultural commodity 
to earn ready cash. This led to gluts and other problems as Northern nations, anxious to 
protect their own farming sector, protected themselves against commodity imports. 
Dr. Ranee Khooshie Lal Panjabi, From Stockholm to Rio: A Comparison of the Declaratory Principles 
of International Environmental Law, 21 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 215, 241 (1993).  
 22. June Nash, The Challenge of Trade Liberalization to Cultural Survival on the Southern 
Frontier of Mexico, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 367, 391 (1994). 
 23. Michael W. Goldman, Michael C. McClintock, James J. Tallaksen, & Richard J. Wolkowitz, 
An Introduction to Direct Foreign Investment in Mexico, 5 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 101 (1994). 
 The privatization schemes of the Salinas government dismantled a large part of Mexico’s 
economy and concentrated wealth and power in what the president considered to be big, 
competitive conglomerates for [Mexico’s] entry into the world scene. The losers were small 
and medium-size businesses, lacking credit, and Mexican society as a whole, lacking the 
public investments that had once had repercussions across the whole economic board, 
stimulating further payments, employment, production, and a healthier balance of payments.  
CARLOS FUENTES, A NEW TIME FOR MEXICO 78–79 (1996). Could not the PPP, as an extension of 
NAFTA and an internal plan for the development of the southern area of Mexico, simply be 
considered a modern version of the Salinas government’s vision of a corporate-driven Mexico on the 
world scene? 
 24. Kimberly Olson, Note, Will Fox Change Chiapas? Not Unless Trade Partners Understand 
the Real Issues, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 459, 475 (2001). Zedillo is credited with leaving office 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/6
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2000, Vicente Fox was elected the president of Mexico.25 A member of the 
conservative National Action Party, Fox’s presidency ended the 
Institutional Revolutionary party’s seventy-year control.26  
Mexico initially employed a closed market strategy of using import-
substituting industrialization (ISI), which forced domestic consumers to 
pay high tariffs on imported goods or to purchase items produced in 
Mexico regardless of their price or quality.27 This system created 
inefficient industries, and as a result, deprived Mexican consumers of the 
ability to purchase higher quality products.28 Internal industry, on the other 
hand, was protected.29 As a result of this economic philosophy, Mexico’s 
economy faltered. The economic situation in Mexico reached epidemic 
levels in 1994 when the value of the peso plummeted by more than sixty 
percent.30 
2. Land Rights and Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution  
The tumultuous history of land rights in Mexico has also contributed to 
the poor condition of Mexico’s small coffee farmers, many of whom are 
indigenous people.31 Land records in Mexico are notoriously disorganized 
and sparsely maintained, resulting in multiple claims to the same plots of 
land.32 The Constitution of 1917 created the Land Reform Act, which 
granted communal lands to Indian communities. This grant provided a 
collective base for Indians to immediately cultivate small plots of land.33 
Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution also solidified Mexican land tenure 
after his six-year mandatory single term as Mexico was experiencing a “fifteen percent economic 
growth rate and a fifteen-year low in unemployment.” Id.  
 25. Mexican General Says President Is Hiding Rights Violations, GLOBAL EXCHANGE, Nov. 11, 
2001, at http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/mexico/news/efe111101 (last visited Apr. 14, 
2004).  
 26. Id.  
 27. Jonathan B. Wight, Does Free Trade Cause Hunger? Hidden Implications of the FTAA, 2 
RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 167, 169 (2001).  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Jeanine E. Dames, Note, An Examination of Mexico and the Unreasonable Goals of the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 10 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 
71, 77 (1998).  
 31. In May 2001, the World Bank provided a set of recommendations to the new Mexican 
administration. David Bacon, The Fruits of NAFTA, Feb. 2002, http://www.zmag.org/Zmag/articles/ 
february02bacon.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2004). An additional recommendation was to remove 
Article 27 from the Mexican Constitution entirely. Id. President Vicente Fox stated that the World 
Bank’s recommendations were “very much in line with what we have contemplated” and necessary to 
“really enter into a process of sustainable development.” Id.  
 32. Id. 
 33. Nash, supra note 22, at 371. 
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law by granting all land, water, and mineral rights to the Mexican 
People.34 On November 7, 1991, President Carlos Salinas proposed that 
“Article 27’s guarantees of land for landless rural communities, as well as 
its prohibitions on the ownership of rural land by corporations be 
deleted.”35 The legislature approved this proposal, and as a result, 
corporations and other businesses are now able to purchase land, air, and 
water rights, while small-scale farmers are forced to fight for the right to 
farm on small plots of land that were formally held by indigenous 
people.36 Critics have suggested that the government amended article 27 as 
a preparatory step for the ratification of the North Atlantic Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), because erasing the land rights of ejidos37 creates an 
opportunity for privatization and allows corporations to gain property 
rights in some of the most resource-rich areas of Mexico, including the 
biologically diverse area in the south.38 
3. The Turmoil in Chiapas  
The Zapatista revolt took place as a result of the enaction of NAFTA; 
this revolt could be seen as a symbolic opposition to Mexico’s greatest 
turn towards globalization.39 In opposition to the extension of free trade to 
the United States and Canada, rebels torched the town hall and other 
 34. James J. Kelly, Jr., Note, Article 27 and Mexican Land Reform: The Legacy of Zapata’s 
Dream, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 541, 542 (1994).  
 35. Id. at 544. 
 36. Id. The new legislation also enabled agrarian communities to sell or rent their individual plots 
of land. Id. See also Raidza Torres Wick, Commentaries on Raidza Torres, The Rights of Indigenous 
Populations: The Emerging International Norm, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 291 (2000) (“Most of the 
challenges faced by indigenous populations, such as loss of land and self-rule, result mainly from their 
collective and unique history of colonization or invasion and their struggle to preserve their identity 
and culture as a separate and distinct people.”). 
 37. The ejido are Mexican peasants who, under article 27 of the 1917 Constitution, were able to 
live communally in private property expropriated by the Mexican government. Enrique R. Carrasco, 
Law, Hierarchy, and Vulnerable Groups in Latin America: Towards a Communal Model of 
Development in a Neoliberal World, 30 STAN. J. INT’L L. 221, 252–55 (1994). 
 38. Olson, supra note 24, at 463. 
 39. Paul Rich, NAFTA and Chiapas, 550 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 72, 73 (1997). 
The revolt occurred and NAFTA was enacted on January 1, 1994. Subcommandante Marcos, leader of 
the Zapatistas, describes how the extreme disparity of wealth contributed to the rebellion: 
It is precisely in regions with high percentages of indigenous peoples that can be found a 
systematic political, juridical, economic violence that has led, in some cases, to the outbreak 
of violent, armed conflicts. The EZLN, in Chiapas, was born amongst indigenous peoples 
who, most of all, demand dignified living conditions. They prefer, as they say, risking their 
life in a dignified manner, rather than dying little by little from the diseases of poverty. 
Id. at 78.  
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important state buildings, which they considered symbols of oppression.40 
The Mexican military invaded the area to suppress the insurgency.41 
Subcommandante Marcos, the head of the revolutionary army, waged an 
e-mail and Internet campaign against the government of Mexico in order 
to alert the world to the plight of the indigenous people and to the Mexican 
government’s attempts at suppression.42 Despite guerilla tactics and 
constant military occupation,43 the Zapatista revolutionaries retained 
control of the Chiapas region of Mexico.44 While President Vicente Fox 
made regaining control of Chiapas within the first month of his presidency 
a priority during his campaign, he has not yet succeeded in establishing an 
agreement with the revolutionaries or in ousting them from this resource-
rich region.45  
B. World Trade Agreement on Agriculture 
The members of the World Trade Organization reasserted their belief 
in the importance of free trade in economic development and the 
elimination of poverty on November 14, 2001.46 The nations asserted 
their pledge to extend to all people “the increased opportunities and 
welfare gains that the multilateral trading system generates.”47 The 
WTO is essentially the foundation on which NAFTA rests.48 However, 
the rules governing agricultural trade (and embodied in the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture) allow the United States and the European 
Union to subsidize agricultural production and dump surpluses on world 
 40. Jorge A. Vargas, NAFTA, The Chiapas Rebellion, and the Emergence of Mexican Ethnic 
Law, 25 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 1, 1–2 (1994).  
 41. Id. at 3. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Jeffrey Gesell, Note, Customary Indigenous Law in the Mexican Judicial System, 26 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 643, 648 (1997). As a first step to recognizing the rights of indigenous people and 
remedying the situation in Chiapas, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari amended article 4 of the 
Mexican Constitution in 1992 in order to provide additional protection for indigenous peoples. Id. at 
648–49.  
 This recognition of indigenous rights within the legal system helped coffee farmers to assert their 
land rights within the judicial system of Mexico. Additionally, a Peace Accord was signed in February 
1996 that addressed some of the concerns of the Zapatistan rebels. Id. at 649. 
 44. Vargas, supra note 40. See also Rich, supra note 39. 
 45. Olson, supra note 24, at 478. See also Patrick Cuninghame, Carolina Ballesteros Corona, A 
Rainbow at Midnight: Zapatistas and Autonomy, CAPITAL & CLASS, 1998.  
 46. Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, 
Food, Security, and Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 433, 435 (2002). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Maria Leichner, Nicola Borregaard, & Ana Karina 
Gonzalez, A New Mechanism for Hemispheric Cooperation on Environmental Sustainability and 
Trade?, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 613, 616 (2002).  
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markets at artificially depressed prices while requiring developing 
countries to open up their markets to ruinous and unfair competition 
from industrialized international producers.49  
C. The North American Free Trade Agreement50 
More than twenty years ago, Mexico51 hoped to advance into the 
developed world by committing itself to free market reforms through 
NAFTA.52 NAFTA essentially created a hemispheric zone in which tariffs 
are greatly reduced between state parties.53 
Mexico’s commitment to NAFTA met with broad skepticism and 
revolt.54 Critics argued that the small Mexican producers and farmers 
would be unable to compete with subsidized American and Canadian 
producers.55 Small-scale farmers recognized their inability to transport 
their goods to areas in which the products might be able to enter the global 
 49. See generally Gonzalez, supra note 46. 
 50. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 296 and 
32 I.L.M. 605 (1993). Article 2203 mandated that the treaty was to go into effect on January 1, 1994. 
Id. 
 51. Twenty-five years ago, Mexico was protectionist and shielded by a dictatorship and closed 
economy. Recently, Mexico has created commercial agreements with over thirty countries worldwide 
and become a leading global free trade leader, to the benefit of its large corporations. Citizen Action in 
the Americas, No. 1, Making Fair Trade Work in Mexico, July 2002, AMERICA’S POLICY, 
http://www.americaspolicy.org/citizen-action/series/body-mexicos-fair-trade-movement.html (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2004). This transition to a free trade economy has inexorably harmed small-scale 
farmers and could disrupt not only the livelihood of the majority of the Mexican population, but 
destroy the villages and culture of southeastern Mexico. Id. 
 52. Ginger Thompson, Free-Market Upheaval Grinds Mexico’s Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
4, 2002. NAFTA, considered the centerpiece of the new Mexican philosophy, has generated a quarter 
of a trillion dollars in cross-border trading with the United States. 
 53. Goldman et al., supra note 23, at 121. Goldman asserts that “Mexico, a nation whose workers 
have endured chronic unemployment, should benefit from increases in the availability or increases in 
the number of jobs, which should foster economic growth, discourage immigration into the United 
States, and create wealth, thereby enabling Mexican nationals to enjoy a higher standard of living.” Id.  
 54. Vargas, supra note 40. The Zapatista Liberation Army took over the Chiapas region of 
Mexico as part of its rebellion against the Mexican government. The Zapatistas wanted a long-range 
plan focusing on business instead of agriculture and to bring investments into Mexico instead of 
reviving the economic structure already in place. Id. This led to a month of guerilla warfare as the 
Mexican government tried to regain control of the area, which is rich in natural resources, particularly 
petroleum. Id. Two of the Zapatistas’ demands were “to revise the text of NAFTA to incorporate the 
interests and needs of the indigenous peoples” and “to amend Article 27 of Mexico’s Constitution, so 
lands will be given to indigenous peoples and not to ‘large landholders.’” Id. at 5.  
 55. Critic Jonathan B. Wight stated: “[f]ree trade may exacerbate hunger problems among 
families in poor agricultural areas of Latin America where labor markets are uncompetitive, land rights 
questionable, or land distribution highly uneven.” Wight, supra note 27, at 167. In the portion of 
southern Mexico covered by the PPP “Labor markets are uncompetitive, land rights questionable, or 
land distribution highly uneven.” Id. 
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market.56 Additionally, they feared that well-funded, well-educated 
workers in the United States and Canada would take their jobs.57  
The Mexican government’s policies, realized through its commitment 
to NAFTA and the favorable treatment accorded to business and 
corporations instead of small businesses, resulted in greater rates of 
unemployment and dislocation and increased poverty among laborers.58 
However, as a scholar stated, “[a] culture of fairness must exist because 
political and economic stability are a prerequisite to trade growth.”59 The 
Mexican governmental structure is not established in a way that cultivates 
trade growth by focusing on the working class.60 
D. International Coffee Agreements 
The coffee-producing and coffee-consuming nations of the world 
realized the necessity of creating firm agreements directed specifically at 
the coffee industry. The first International Coffee Agreement (ICA)61 was 
signed by thirty-seven nations in 1962.62 As the first step toward the 
 56. Id. 
 57. Padua, supra note 15, at 16–17. See also Wight, supra note 27, at 172.  
 58. See Lola Clayton Rainey, Monopolistic Land Tenure and Free Trade in Mexico: 
Resurrecting the Ghost of Porfirian Economics, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 217, 219 (1999). 
 59. Id. at 218. 
 60. Id. A perfect example of the Mexican government’s focus on business at the expense of the 
worker is the election of Vicente Fox as Mexico’s president and the adoption of the Puebla-Panama 
Plan. See infra Part II. 
 61. International Coffee Agreement 1983, opened for signature Jan. 1, 1983, T.I.A.S. No. 11,095, 
1333 U.N.T.S. 1983. 
 62. Thomas C. Mann, a U.S. State Department official, described the International Coffee 
Agreements before a U.S. congressional subcommittee, stating: 
The freely competitive interplay of economic forces in the United States is one of the basic 
elements of our past and present national strength. A free market economy in coffee should 
perhaps be an ultimate goal. But the reality is that many of the developing countries of the 
world which depend so much on coffee cannot now cope with the severe economic 
dislocations which are caused by wide swings in the price of their principal revenue and 
foreign exchange earner . . . The coffee agreement . . . serves our foreign policy objectives of 
building strength and freedom in developing areas of the world while protecting the American 
consumer . . . [T]he key question is whether it is in the U.S. interest to allow these countries, a 
large number of them, to go through the wringer, as it were, at a time when populations are 
doubling every 18 to 20 years and take a chance that they would stay on our side of the 
curtain which divides the free and the Communist world. 
Barbara Koremenos, Can Cooperation Survive Changes in Bargaining Power? The Case of Coffee, 31 
J. LEGAL STUD. 259, 271–72 (2002) (quoting the Executive Hearings on S. 701 before the House 
Comm. on Ways and Means, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 9 (1965)). Additionally, the National Coffee 
Association advised the U.S. that “the interests of the United States Coffee consumer and industry are 
best accommodated by free and unrestricted trade in coffee.” Matthew J. Foli, Note, International 
Coffee Agreements and the Elusive Goal of Price Stability, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 79, 80 n.11 
(1995) (quoting the National Coffee Ass’n of U.S.A., NCA SPECIAL BULLETIN, No. 259 (1992)). 
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globalization of the coffee industry, the ICA of 1962 established export 
quotas aimed at maintaining that year’s prices.63 The goal of the plan was 
undermined, however, as anxious exporters quickly learned new methods64 
to subvert the Agreement for financial gain.65 
The ICA of 1968, in addition to resetting export quotas, established a 
Diversification Fund to support alternative industries and the production of 
a greater variation of crops in nations that produce coffee.66 In addition, 
the ICA of 1968 included measures for determining an “indicator price,” 
which helped to alleviate any conflicts between nations with large or small 
coffee production. The indicator price extends or reduces quotas 
depending on the market price for coffee.67 
The ICA of 197668 established a partially variable quota system. This 
system provided incentive to countries with historically smaller levels of 
production to increase their coffee production. The ICA of 1976 deleted 
the Diversification Fund.69 
In 1983, due to the variable quotas, the coffee producing countries 
faced a new challenge with a surplus of coffee already in the market.70 
Therefore, the ICA of 1983 was drafted to establish a two-tier pricing 
system in which surplus stock was sold at an extreme discount.71 The 
additional demand for gourmet coffee beans also altered the quota 
structure when the ICA nations agreed to specify types of beans for the 
quotas.72  
The International Coffee Agreements, however, proved to be 
ineffective.73 One reason for the Agreements’ inability to adequately 
 63. Foli, supra note 62, at 86. The two leading coffee-producing states, Brazil and Colombia, led 
the International Coffee Organization, which has been suggested to have restrained competition in its 
pursuit of a higher market price for coffee. Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of 
Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167, 182 (1999). Benvenisti suggests that the United States, the 
world’s largest coffee importer, perpetuated a scheme by which it surreptitiously shifted funds to Latin 
America in its support of the ICAs. Id.  
 64. Foli, supra note 62, at 87. Countries found ways to evade the ICA by admitting coffee 
imports without the required documentation, by using invalid documentation, and by shipping coffee 
to low-consumption countries and then re-directing the coffee to other high-consumation countries. Id. 
at 87. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 88–89. Examples of alternative industries and crop development include establishing 
alternative methods of growing coffee or producing different varieties and flavors of beans. Id. 
 67. Id. at 89. 
 68. Id. at 91. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 91–92. 
 71. Id. at 92. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id.  
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control the coffee market was that the ICAs did not include an 
enforcement mechanism. Additionally, countries consistently discovered 
varying ways of circumventing their requirements and duties under the 
Agreements. Thus, the ICAs were allowed to expire in 1989.74 At that 
time, having stored surplus beans during the quota period, countries such 
as Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico inundated the market with coffee.75 As a 
result, greater amounts of coffee accumulated and the price of coffee 
quickly fell.76  
The Association of Coffee Producing Countries, a producer cartel, 
implemented the Coffee Retention Plan on October 1, 1993.77 The goal of 
the Plan was to reduce the number of global exports by requiring all 
countries producing coffee to store a certain percentage of beans.78 Unlike 
previous International Coffee Agreements, this Plan contained severe 
penalties for cheaters.79 Mexico did not sign this Plan.80 Although over ten 
years have passed since the creation of the Coffee Retention Plan, “it is 
too early to determine whether the improvements upon previous 
International Coffee Agreements in the 1993 Plan will finally achieve the 
elusive goal of long-term price stability.”81  
E. Plan Puebla-Panama (PPP) 
Instituted by President Vicente Fox in 2001, the Plan Puebla-Panama82 
is an effort by the new Mexican regime to build infrastructure, industry, 
development, and natural resource management.83 The official position of 
the Mexican government84 is as follows: “The main target of the Puebla-
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 93. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. at 95. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. at 97.  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Press Release, Mexico, Fifth Tuxtla Dialogue and Agreement Mechanism Summit and 
Puebla-Panama Plan Expo Investment 2002, Release (June 25, 2002), http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/ 
Art=3721&Orden=Leer (last visited Apr. 15, 2004). See also Lucy Grinnell, Plan Puebla Panama and 
Chiapas, Znet, July 31, 2002, at http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?Section ID=8& 
ItemID2172 (last visited Mar. 12, 2004). The PPP affects Mexico’s nine southern-most states—
Puebla, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Chiapas, Veracruz, Tabasco, Yucatan, Campeche, and Quintana Roo. Id.  
 83. Segger, supra note 48, at 621. 
 84. The PPP is supported by U.S. President George W. Bush, the Inter-American Development 
Bank, the World Bank, and the Central American Development Bank. Grinnell, supra note 82. See 
also Padua, supra note 15. 
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Panama Plan is to improve the standard of living of the population85 within 
the territorial area of the south and south-eastern region of Mexico and 
Central American countries.”86 Much of the area of southeastern Mexico, 
including the Veracruz, Guerrero, Oazaca, and Chiapas regions, are 
traditionally coffee-producing states.87 The PPP’s goals are divided into 
eight main objectives,88 five of the most significant are: (1) raising the 
level of human and social development of the population; (2) reaching a 
higher level of participation of civil society in development; (3) achieving 
structural changes in the dynamics of the economy; (4) promoting 
productive investments that increase the offer for well-paying jobs; and (5) 
modernizing and fortifying the capabilities of institutions in the region.89 
One of the primary goals of the PPP is to extend the maquiladora90 region 
from the northern part of Mexico to the south. This expansion would 
 85. Although many statistics exist regarding the standard of living in the areas affected by the 
PPP, perhaps the most telling is that of the sixty-five million people who live in the nine PPP states, 
where seventy-five percent subsist on less than $2 (U.S.) per day. The Plan Puebla Panama In a 
Nutshell: A PPP Primer of 17 Questions and Answers, Chiapas Today Bulletin No. 312, CIEPAC, 
Sept. 27, 2002, http://www.clepac.org/bullentins/ingles/ing312.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2004). In fact, 
in 1997, the following was reported with regard to San Cristobal de las Casas, a town in the Chiapas 
state:  
Unemployment exceeds sixty percent; Mexican government census bureau statistics report 
that seventy-eight percent of the population live in overcrowded shacks with dirt floors, sixty-
six percent of which lack electricity, forty percent which lack sewers and water. More than 
forty-percent of the people are illiterate and sixty-two percent never completed the sixth 
grade. 
Gesell, supra note 43, at 649.  
 86. Padua, supra note 15. While the goal of the PPP is to improve the standard of living of those 
living within the affected area, which has been notorious for bein the poorest region of Mexico, the 
Plan has met with some resistance. Nearly 15,000 Tzeltal, Tzotzil, and Tojolabal Mayans protested the 
development plan in San Cristobal de las Casas on August 16, 2002. Led by Roman Catholic Bishop 
Felipe Arizmendi, the protestors carried signs, chanted, and sang in the streets of Chiapas’ largest city 
in order to draw attention to their concerns regarding Mexico’s new plan. Alejandro Ruiz, Thousands 
of Indians Protest Fox Backed Development Plan, THE NEWS MEXICO, Aug. 17, 2002, 
http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/mexico/ppp/284.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).  
 87. See Black, supra note 7. 
 88. Roberto Garduno, Romper Con La Transmision Generacional de la Pobreza, Objetivo Del 
Plan Puebla-Panama: Fox, La Jornada (Mexico), June 14, 2001 at 6. 
 89. Padua, supra note 15, at 28. Other objectives include taking full advantage of the different 
abilities and comparative advantages of each economy, reaching sustainable management of natural 
resources and the environment, and promoting agreements and joint development strategies between 
the south and south-east region of Mexico and its neighboring Central American countries. Id. 
 90. A maquiladora is a low-wage Mexican assembly plant where American goods are assembled 
before being shipped to the United States or Asia. Francisco Rojas, Foro Por la Vida, Guatemala, 
Plan Puebla Panama and Indigenous Survival, INDYMEDIA CHIAPAS, Mar. 17, 2002, 
http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/mexico/ppp/indymedia031702.html (last visited Apr. 15, 
2004).  
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provide enormous savings to U.S. and European multinational 
corporations through more efficient shipping.91  
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Problems in the Villages  
The previous efforts at regulating the coffee industry and the coffee-
producing areas of Mexico have been unsuccessful.92 The continuing 
depression of the industry has resulted in the destitution of villages93 
traditionally reliant on the coffee industry for their livelihoods.94 In order 
to provide for their families, many Mexican coffee farmers have been 
forced to burn or log their land to make the land useful for the production 
of other, more profitable crops.95 Other coffee farmers have been forced to 
abandon their land rights claims96 and have traveled to America in search 
of jobs that could provide income for their families.97 Additionally, many 
 91. Id. Extending the maquiladora region to the southern portion of Mexico may also help to 
assuage Mexico’s fears that large multinational corporations will increasingly follow the trend of 
building such factories in Asia, where labor is so cheap that it overrides the higher cost of transport. A 
1992 Newsweek article revealed a U.S. government study, which stated that “four of five American 
companies operating plants across the border in Mexico admitted they were there to take advantage of 
weak environmental laws.” Dr. Ranee Khooshie Lal Panjabi, supra note 21, at 235. 
 92. See supra note 29. 
 93. Often only women, children and the elderly remain in the village due to massive migration of 
men in search of jobs. “Men’s migration has obligated indigenous women to occupy positions in 
community assemblies and other local political environments,” stated Centolia Maldonado, a Mixteca 
activist for the Binational Indigenous Oaxacan Front. Eduardo Stanley, The Awakening of Mixteca 
Women, NEW CALIFORNIA MEDIA, Oct. 31, 2002, at http://www.news.ncmonline.com/news/ 
view_article.html?article_id=dc50a847C0a3dd0F06da1169bb5b236 (last visited Apr. 15, 2004). See 
also Joseph Nevins, Time to End a Fatal Way of Life Along the U.S.-Mexico Boundary, 
CommonDreams News Center, June 18, 2002, at http://www.commondreams.org/views02/0618-
03.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2004).  
 94. Id. 
 95. According to a senior farm official at a meeting of the International Coffee Organization, 
“coffee farmers . . . driven to desperation by rock-bottom prices, are abandoning the crop to plant 
forests instead or even emigrating.” Black, supra note 7.  
 Additionally, “the rapid loss of forests corresponds to a simultaneous increase in farming and 
grazing lands cleared by the 10 to 15 million poor farmers who have no other means of making a 
living.” Lisa J. Adams, Mexico In Danger of Losing Forests, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 5, 2001. 
 96. In the Mexican village of El Equimite in Veracruz state, Ranulfo Barreda mourns the loss of 
his son and grandson, who were among fourteen immigrants who died in the desert in May 2001 near 
Yuma, Arizona. Six of the dead were coffee farmers whose relatives may lose their land, as they used 
it as collateral to secure loans of nearly $3,000 to pay smugglers. See Jarman, supra note 4. 
 97. According to Governor Pablo Salazar, 500 coffee farmers from the Chiapas state are being 
uprooted each month. On a bus trip to the northern border, a reporter from the Reforma daily national 
newspaper reported that fifteen percent of the passengers had sold their coffee patches to pay for the 
price of the bus ticket. Besides being a luxury that many uprooted farmers cannot afford,the dusty 
conditions and frequent governmental and police stops at which the passengers are extorted, have led 
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teenagers have been forced by the economic situations of their families to 
move to the cities in search of work at a very young age.98 This 
phenomenon has left many villages composed entirely of women and 
children, who are forced to take part-time and dangerous jobs to sustain 
their life and shelter.99 As a result, villages have not sustained their 
traditional customs, such as dances or festivals.100  
Increased violence is another unfortunate result of the depression of the 
coffee industry.101 Some of the increased violence is a reaction against the 
government and army members, while other violence occurs within 
villages as a result of the extreme poverty that causes anger, frustration, 
and crime.102 Furthermore, greater numbers of former coffee farmers have 
turned to producing drugs, which are easier to produce than coffee, are in 
higher demand in the market, and are more profitable.103 This increase in 
drug production is also a potential source of violence.104 
Another problem that faced villages following NAFTA’s 
implementation, was that Mexican unemployment skyrocketed. Many 
small and medium-sized businesses closed because they were unable to 
compete with U.S. and Canadian corporations.105 
A country’s success under the NAFTA regime requires constant 
educational and technological advancements.106 The literacy rate in 
Mexico is staggeringly low, with a higher number of illiterate citizens 
concentrated in rural areas, such as coffee farming areas.107 Further, many 
many to attempt to hitch a free ride on a daily freight train. This dangerous alternative often results in 
the death or maiming of migrants, and limbs are often uncovered along the tracks. Upon reaching the 
border, many farmers have attempted the scorching trek across the Arizona desert by foot. Hundreds of 
Mexican citizens have died attempting this journey. See Elizabeth Neuffer, The Shadows of 
Globalization: The Coffee Connection: Thousands of Miles from Boston’s Breakfast Tables and Fast-
Food Restaurants, at the End of a Global Trade Network, Guatemala’s Farmers are Barely Scraping 
By, BOSTON GLOBE, July 19, 2001. An estimated 130,000 Mexican coffee farmers have abandoned 
their farms in search of alternate work or to look for such opportunities in the United States. Id.  
 98. Jarman, supra note 4.  
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.  
 102. See generally Miguel Jauregui Rojas, Review of Legal Developments in Mexico: 2000–2001, 
10 U.S. MEX. L.J. 3 (2002). 
 103. See Jarman, supra note 4. 
 104. Jarman, supra note 4. 
 105. See Cuninghame, supra note 45, at 10. Women were forced into less secure industries, such 
as the sex industry and “other branches of the ‘informal’ economy” in order to support themselves and 
their children. Id. at 44.  
 106. Rich, supra note 39, at 78. 
 107. See Gesell, supra note 43. See also Jarman, supra note 4. 
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of these little villages, which rely on coffee farming for sustinence, exist 
without running water or electricity.108 
B. Fair Trade 
Fair trade109 has been touted as the solution to the continual depression 
of the coffee industry.110 Fair trade attempts to correct the problems in a 
free trade market, in which corporations are favored over small-scale 
business owners.111 The effect of free trade markets is that smaller 
producers are disadvantaged because they lack the capital, access to credit, 
technical and marketing assistance, and delivery assistance of larger 
companies.112 While fair trade systems have proven effective,113 fair trade 
 108. See Gesell, supra note 43. Ironically, the Chiapas region holds most of Mexico’s oil and 
produces the largest amount of hydroelectric electricity, yet the citizens of this region have the lowest 
percentage of homes with electricity and running water. Id. 
 109. The principles of fair trade are: 
 Local and regional producers and service providers should be in control so benefits 
remain in their communities; 
 Laborers should earn a fair wage and work in a healthy, safe environment;  
 Intermediary organizations that soak up and expatriate profits should be removed from 
the equation, allowing producers to keep a larger share of sales revenues without passing on 
excessive costs to consumers; 
 Goods and services should be environmentally friendly and socially responsible; 
 Community development needs, as well as environmental and social criteria, should be 
taken into account in business decisions; 
 Product and producer diversity should be supported, and increased opportunities for 
women should be a priority; 
 When possible, intermediaries that buy products directly from producers should provide 
financial assistance, such as direct loans, prepayments, or linking producers with sources of 
financing; 
 The finances, management policies, and business practices of fair trade enterprises 
should be open to public scrutiny; 
 Consumers who are educated regarding the importance of purchasing products and 
services that support living wages, healthy working conditions, and environmental protection 
will be willing to pay slightly higher prices. 
Talli Nauman, Making Fair Trade Work in Mexico, CITIZEN ACTION IN THE AMERICAS, No. 1, July 
2002, http://www.americaspolicy.org/citizen-action/series/body_mexicos-fair-trade-movement.html 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2004).  
 110. See also Draeger, supra note 13; Alicia Morris Groos, Comment, International Trade and 
Development: Exploring the Impact of Fair Trade Organizations in the Global Economy and the Law, 
34 TEX. INT’L L. J. 379 (1999). 
 111. See generally Nauman, supra note 109. 
 112. Id. Fair trade attempts to correct these faults of the free market economy by establishing 
support networks that help to provide access to start-up capital, product development, marketing 
assistance, and foreign distribution outlets. Nauman, supra note 109. 
 113. In 1999, Central American farmers selling their coffee to intermediary buyers through 
ordinary channels were paid an average of $0.38 per pound, while coffee growers engaged in sales 
with the international fair trade organization TransFair earned at least $1.26 per pound. Nauman, supra 
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alone is an impractical solution for the failing coffee industry in Mexico. 
In fact, one journalist identified several challenges to the establishment of 
a complete fair trade system in Mexico, including the “instability of 
international commodity prices . . . nonprofit technical support for small 
businesses [not] keeping pace with the growth of new fair trade start-ups 
. . . and the certification and fair trade labeling regimes are expensive and 
inappropriate for Mexican entrepreneurs.”114  
An additional factor to consider is the rate of farm burning or 
abandonment. At the current rate, Mexican coffee farmers will be unable 
to maintain their farms or feed their families by the time that a completely 
fair market system is established. The establishment of such a system goes 
directly to the heart of the problems within the coffee industry: a lack of 
funding, poor transportation systems, and the small-scale Mexican 
farmer’s inability to make a connection with retailers directly. 
Traditionally, many coffee producers are indigenous workers and “often 
speak traditional languages and dialects and are illiterate.”115 The price of 
coffee in the international market is dropping at record rates.116 Short of 
burning the almost two billion pounds of surplus beans and starting anew, 
the grassroots advocacy strategy of the Fair Trade Organization will not 
impact the lives of the farmers quickly enough to feed their families or 
save their villages.117 Additionally, although fair trade is considered by 
some to be the savior of the small-scale farming operations in developing 
countries, fair trade organizations do not have the resources to bring the 
requisite aid to Mexican coffee farmers.118 
C. Problems with the PPP 
The PPP is a plan for businessmen, by businessmen, about business.119 
Because the plan has only existed for two years, it may be too early to 
determine its effectiveness.120 The basic structure of the PPP, however, 
note 109. 
 114. Id.  
 115. See Wight, supra note 27, at 173. 
 116. See supra Part I. 
 117. See Draeger, supra note 13. 
 118. See Draeger, supra note 13. See also Groos, supra note 109, at 402. There are definite legal 
issues involved in fair trade, because “Fair trade is relevant to many issues affecting developing 
countries that are of global concern, such as trade, economics, human rights, intellectual property, and 
cultural preservation.” Id. Fair trade organizations also perform the functions of lobbying corporations, 
state parties and non-governmental or multi-governmental organizations to adopt fair trade policies 
and legislation. Id. at 388. 
 119. See Padua, supra note 15. 
 120. See Ross, supra note 83. 
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does not lend itself to the resuscitation of current industries, strips current 
farmers of their land claims,121 and imposes questionably functional 
industry into the southern portion of Mexico.122 Under the PPP, the coffee 
farmers may be forced to work in one of the maquiladoras that President 
Fox seeks to bring to south south eastern Mexico.123  
The PPP, in its current form, seems to simply be an extension of 
NAFTA. While only Mexico, Canada, and the United States are parties to 
NAFTA, the PPP could be considered a method of “roping in” other 
Central American countries into NAFTA’s web without actually enacting 
additional treaties.124  
IV. PROPOSAL 
Fair trade is not the answer. The PPP is not the answer. In order to 
survive the current, ever-deepening economic crisis and resuscitate the 
floundering coffee industry, Mexico must take steps both independently 
and with the world community to correct the internal injustices 
 121. Previous Mexican governments gave and subsequently withdrew land rights to family plots 
in order to draw support for elections. Uprisings and rebellions, such as the Zapatista rebellions, arose 
in an effort to protect land rights claims. Gretchen Peters, No Quick Solution to Deforestation in Lush 
Chiapas, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 14, 2002.  
 122. One positive aspect of the PPP plan is its role in the creation of infrastructure throughout this 
region. For example, an improved system of transportation would benefit current coffee farmers by 
replacing the small paths which remain the small-scale farmers’ only means of transporting coffee 
beans to middlemen. The creation of navigable roads would do much to facilitate the expedited and 
efficient transportation of the coffee beans. 
 123. A recent study by SEDEPAC found that the average maquiladora worker earns between 320 
and 350 pesos per week, while approximately 1,500 pesos are required to provide food, shelter and 
transportation to a family of four. Bacon, supra note 31. Further, a study by the Interfaith Center for 
Corporate Responsibility found that it took a maquiladora worker in Juarez almost one hour and a 
worker in Tijuana an hour and a half to earn enough money to purchase one kilo of rice. By 
comparison, a dockworker in the San Pedro harbor could buy the same amount of rice after three 
minutes of work, while an undocumented immigrant working for the minimum wage in Los Angeles 
would only have to work for twelve minutes. Id. An example of wage deflation as compared to price 
inflation is that “in 1996 in Mexico the minimum day’s wage [would] buy 6 quarts of milk or 2.2 
pounds of beans, whereas in 1976 it would buy 21 quarts of milk or 5.0 pounds of beans.” See Rich, 
supra note 39, at 79. 
 124. The PPP may be seen as a manner of channeling Mexican national funds into the least 
developed areas of Mexico in an effort to pave the way for greater corporate investment. It may also be 
seen as an internal step towards a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). See The Plan Puebla 
Panama In a Nutshell: A PPP Primer of 17 Questions and Answers, supra note 85. The FTAA is a 
proposed trade agreement that would extend NAFTA’s trade regulations throughout the Western 
Hemisphere. Id. The PPP may consistute the first step in integrating the southeastern area of Mexico 
with the other Central American states in preparation for the FTAA or a similar agreement. Id. The 
article suggests that the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank for Mexico and 
Central America, which will use the infrastructure to entice large multi-national corporations to invest 
in and move to the area affected, are the primary proponents of the PPP. Id. 
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experienced by small coffee farmers and to destroy the surpluses that keep 
the international coffee prices depressed. Additionally, Mexico should 
create, regulate, and maintain an updated agricultural system to provide 
continued living wages to coffee producers.  
Mexican farmers should also learn from the fair trade groups’ focus on 
communal production and form their own trade organizations. In this way, 
small-scale Mexican coffee farmers could pool their resources and 
establish a trade organization that could market its beans in the global 
economy and compete with international producers. In this way, small-
scale farmers would have the resources and the support needed to enter 
their products in the global market without restricting their products to the 
certain types of beans and methods of farming required to obtain fair trade 
certification. 
To do so, however, requires funding, something that small Mexican 
farmers are sorely lacking.125 The traditional source of such loans or 
subsidies is the Mexican government.126 Although some small coffee 
farmers tried to look to the Mexican government for help and support in 
the midst of this crisis, the result has been disappointing. Mexico should 
create an administrative body and plan to provide subsidies to the farmers 
in order to enable coffee production to continue, to maintain the lands and 
agriculture in the area, and to halt the migration throughout the country.127 
Additionally, this administrative body could facilitate the location of 
private loans for small-scale farmers.  
The PPP appears to apply the “bag it” approach to the existing industry 
in the southeastern parts of Mexico.128 The Plan attempts to impose new 
 125. While farmers have fought to retain control of their coffee farms without any aid from the 
Mexican government, in June, 2002, President Fox announced a $4 billion U.S. credit line for PPP 
infrastructure projects, subsidized by the Inter-American Development Bank. Edgar Hernandez, NGOs 
Say Mexico’s Panama Plan Economic Arm of Military Strategy, Aug. 9, 2002, http://www.global 
exchange.org/countries/mexico/ppp/285.html.pf (last visited Apr. 15, 2004). 
 126. Id. 
 127. The number of internally displaced people in Mexico is increasing, according to the U.S. 
Committee for Refugees (USCR). Jim Lobe, Internally Displaced People Now Outnumber Refugees 
Two to One, OneWorld.net, Sept. 23, 2002, at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0923-
02.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2004).  
 128. The United States and Canada may have employed a similar philosophy regarding certain 
agricultural crops in their respective histories. Unlike Mexico, the United States and Canada have 
provided subsidies and stipends to their farmers to prevent them from producing too much of a certain 
product. Beau Hertig, Note, The 2002 Farm Bill: One Small Step for Family Farmers, One Giant Leap 
Towards Corporate Production in Iowa, 29 J. CORP. L. 199, 201–06 (2003). If the market is flooded 
with excess goods the product price will be driven down and the need for excessive long-term storage 
of the product will arise. See also Larry Lee, Essay, Reading the Seattle Manifesto: In Search of a 
Theory, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2305, 2327 (2003). 
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infrastructure and industry on this area in complete disregard129 of the 
existing industry and the traditional livelihoods of the residents. While 
noble and ambitious, the PPP is completely impractical due to its disregard 
for the Mexican citizens and indigenous people inhabiting the relevant 
area. If the Mexican government would extend the Plan to include small-
scale farmers who produce crops such as coffee, or if a portion of the 
foreign investment could be used to create trade groups that would support 
the existing industries, then the coffee farmers could bind together in small 
trade organizations and survive.  
If the PPP were to be expanded to include respect for the traditional 
uses of the land and the indigenous inhabitants, the resulting coffee 
organizations might benefit from the additional objectives of the PPP, such 
as increased infrastructure. Although the infrastructure might not 
necessarily alleviate the difficulty arising from scaling down steep, 
unpaved, and at times, unmarked slopes carrying hundreds of pounds of 
coffee beans, it would help the farmers to reach ports where they could 
individually market their beans. The additional goal of building dams and 
canals through Central America may allow coffee farmers to find avenues 
to ship coffee to purchasers overseas more easily. The PPP’s goal of 
linking electrical power plants to the area would also benefit struggling 
villages, many of which are currently without electricity. Thus, while the 
PPP in its current state turns a blind eye to the plight of the coffee farmer, 
it can be adapted to consider the poor and indigenous people currently 
inhabiting the affected area. This change, in combination with the Plan’s 
other goals, would promote economic growth in southern Mexico. 
Although, the possible solutions discussed in this Note may be 
effective within Mexico, the coffee crisis has global implications. Without 
a remedy on an international scale, improvements in Mexico alone will do 
little to correct the fledgling market price of coffee in international trade. 
First, the major coffee producing countries should meet to discuss the 
plight that has befallen the industry and to determine methods to restore 
confidence in coffee production. More specifically, countries should seek 
methods of destroying excess coffee beans and imposing a strict system of 
market entry for marketing beans and regulating the quantity of beans in 
the market. This system should reflect the tastes of current consumers, the 
 129. The government has not directly informed the small-scale farmers in Mexico, one of the 
groups most affected by the PPP, of its intended effect on their area and land. See Wendy Call, Farms 
vs. Factories: Planning the Future for the “Under-Exploited” of Mexico and Central America—Plan 
Puebla Panama, TEXAS OBSERVER, available at http://www.s-j-c.net/PPP.html (last visited Apr. 14, 
2004).  
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importance of environmentally-friendly shade-grown beans, and the 
increased demand for gourmet and blended coffees within the retail 
market. In this proposed agreement, the countries may also recognize the 
importance of ensuring that coffee producers are paid adequate and fair 
wages. Coffee-importing states, such as the United States and many 
European nations, should have the opportunity to be a signatory to such an 
agreement, with the requirement that they put pressure on coffee-
producing states to assure that the coffee producers are paid fair wages. 
The agreement should also include an enforcement mechanism and strict 
penalties for circumventing the plan. The lack of such an enforcement 
mechanism was the main pitfall of the original ICAs.130  
An additional faction that must consider taking a stand in the global 
coffee crisis is the international coffee conglomerate. While many of these 
companies have not formally recognized or taken action to aid the coffee 
producers, the profits from each pound of ground coffee sold to individual 
consumers may be enough to triple the current daily living allotment of a 
Mexican coffee farmer’s family.131 A fixture in the daily lives of people 
throughout the world, these coffee companies hold an extreme amount of 
clout among business owners and individuals, and with that, can 
profoundly impact consumers. If several of these companies would take 
the initiative to start a campaign to aid coffee farmers, others would likely 
follow in the spirit of competition and public relations. A campaign as 
simple as a public leaflet and a decrease in the amount of money spent 
printing cups or beverage sleeves (with a percentage saved dedicated to 
helping coffee farmers self-organize), could be the economic impetus that 
many farmers require to survive. The coffee conglomerates should also 
endorse a plan to burn the coffee surpluses, which might constitute a 
facially poor business decision, but would raise the market price of coffee 
in the long-term. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While people around the world leisurely enjoy a hot cappuccino or a 
frozen machiatto, few give thought to the producers of the coffee beans. 
Although complaints are often heard when the corner coffee shop charges 
an extra fifty cents for a second shot of espresso or raises the rates on 
premium coffee beverages, many fail to realize the profound impact an 
extra fifty cents would have on the family of a Mexican coffee producer. 
 130. See supra notes 77–81. 
 131. Fair Trade, Starbucks pamphlet. 
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In November 2002 the U.S. House of Representatives introduced and 
adopted a resolution aimed to “adopt a global strategy to respond to the 
coffee crisis.”132 The legislature intends to address the quality standards 
for the coffee industry and the depressed market price, “creating a 
humanitarian crisis among the world’s subsistence coffee farmers.”133 
While this resolution is a first step in bringing the necessary attention to 
the plight of the coffee farmer, action must be taken both by coffee 
producing countries and by coffee consuming countries to reform the 
system. If the proper resources were given to the farmers and other 
necessary resources, such as land, were not taken from the farmers, then 
the world would be amazed at the quality of beverages produced and the 
strength of these resilient people. 
Amelia M. DeAngelis∗ 
 132. See McLaughlin, supra note 6. 
 133. Id.  
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